报告内容摘要

Most of the appointment scheduling literature to date has assumed that patients will arrive promptly.  In this paper, we instead assume that the doctor acts as a Stackelberg leader in setting the appointment times.  Her patients act as Stackelberg followers, who then choose a target arrival time conditional on these appointment times.  Patients wish to minimize their expected waiting time, but need to maintain a good working relationship with the doctor, which we model by their incurring a psychic “guilt aversion cost” if they make her wait.  We examine different physician responses to tardiness, and investigate the effect that strategic patient behavior has on the physician’s optimal appointment schedule.

报告人简介

Lawrence W. Robinson is a professor in the Operations, Technology, and Information Management group in the Johnson Graduate School of Management of Cornell University.  He received his MBA and Ph.D. from the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago.  His recent research has included the value of information sharing with order commitment in a supply chain, determining the optimal number of handicapped parking spaces, explaining the anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias in the newsvendor problem, and scheduling patients at a doctor’s office.